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Abstract
The demands for nuclear power technologies in the Arctic for solving social and economic problems of the state can 
only be satisfied if adequate strategies of their safe handling at all stages from design to decommissioning are defined, 
methodological approaches and mathematical models for predicting and minimizing adverse environmental impacts 
of potential emergency situations at such facilities are developed, and scientifically-based results yielded within a de-
cision-making support system for the elimination of such emergencies are applied. Special relevance of these require-
ments is determined by unique features of the Arctic nature and its role in the generation of climatic and hydrological 
processes in the World Ocean.
Main results and generalized conclusions based on the analysis of radiological consequences of the large-scale applica-
tion of nuclear power industry for the benefit of economic development of the Arctic region are provided in the present 
paper. The analysis was performed within the framework of the complex research project “Development of the meth-
odological approaches and mathematical models to access the environmental impact of the possible accidents at the 
floating nuclear power objects, model calculations of the radiation propagation in the Arctic aquatic territories in case of 
emergency situations”. The increasing demand for the low-power nuclear power plants for the benefit of development 
of remote areas, the technological and economic advantages of such power plants as well as minimal possible environ-
mental consequences of the hypothetic accidents resulted in the qualitative changes in the attitude towards their usage. 
Estimation was made of the scale of application of nuclear power and results were obtained of numerical modeling of 
distribution of reactivity in case of accidents. The conclusion was drawn on the necessity to adhere to the low-power 
nuclear energy generation development strategy based on the modular design concept.
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Low-power nuclear energy 
generation development strategy
With growing need of world economy in the development 
of natural resources in remote, isolated and scarcely po-
pulated regions demand for self-sustainable, environmen-
tally safe and financially efficient plants of energy incre-
ases. Low-power nuclear power plants (LPNPPs) will be 
highly demanded as energy plants for electricity and ther-
mal power supplies, as well as for technological purpo-
ses. A number of countries with developed nuclear power 
generation make practical steps and undertake large-scale 
efforts for the development of low-power nuclear reactors 
for a wide range of applications.
Large-scale development and implementation of nuclear 
power generation technologies for civil applications in the 
Arctic region of Russia is intended within the framework of 
realization of the plan of measures under the state programs 
“Social and economic development of the Arctic zone of the 
Russian Federation”, “Development of shipbuilding for the 
period of 2013-2030” and “Development of nuclear power 
industrial complex”. Nuclear-powered icebreakers, trans-
portable LPNPPs, cogeneration heat and electricity nuclear 
power plants, submersible LPNPPs for supplying power 
to shelf oil and gas production complexes, nuclear power 
plants for supplying energy for maritime and aviation navi-
gation along the Northern Sea Route and other special ob-
jects of infrastructural development on the littoral northern 
territories are referred in the first place to such technologies.
It is evident that nuclear power plants already imple-
mented or currently under development will constitute 
one of the cornerstones of the transport and energy sectors 
of the Arctic region in the nearest future. As of today this 
means wide variety of design and types of such LPNPPs. 
Efficiency of such scenario of development of low-power 
nuclear energy generation is far from optimal because 
operation of such LPNPPs becomes more complicated 
and development of appropriate infrastructure is required.
Modern requirements on the development of competi-
tive LPNPPs amount to the necessity of batch production 
of power generating units and of centralized infrastructure 
for their operation (scheduled major overhauls, handling 
radioactive wastes (RW) and irradiated nuclear fuel (INF), 
decommissioning, etc.) (Low-Power Nuclear Power Plants 
2015, Sarkisov 2011, The History of Nuclear Power 2004) 
allowing unifying the chain of technological processes and 
reducing the cost of ownership of power generation object in 
case of large-scale development along the chosen direction. 
Organization of the system of types and performance charac-
teristics of nuclear power units used or planned to be used in 
the Arctic, technologies applied for their operation, as well 
as quantitative estimation of the impact on the environment 
in case of potential accidents result in the need to select such 
LPNPPs development strategy based on the implementation 
of modular principle in designing nuclear power plants pro-
viding for the development units of different power capacity 
due to the combination of several units of the same type.
Following the above logic, it is reasonable to address 
design of modular transportable fully factory-assembled 
nuclear power units as the first priority projects.
At present the application of nuclear power units in the 
Arctic and its future potential appear to be as follows.
Nuclear powered ships
Four nuclear powered icebreakers are under operation: 
two Design 10521 icebreakers (Yamal and 50 Years of 
Victory with two OK-900A nuclear steam-generators 
(NSGs)), two Design 10580 shallow draught icebreakers 
(Taymyr and Vaygach with one KLT-40M NSG). Taking 
into consideration the possibility of extension of service 
life of the nuclear power units three out of currently ope-
rated icebreakers will be decommissioned by 2025-2026 
and the only 50 Years of Victory icebreaker will remain 
in operation by 2030. Thorough qualitative re-equipment 
of the fleet of nuclear -powered icebreakers is planned for 
the purposes of providing support to the implementation 
of state tasks on the maintenance of pilotage of sea vessels 
along the Northern Sea Route (Ruksha et al. 2016, Kashka 
et al. 2016, JSC “Afrikantov OKBM” 2018, Kudinovich 
2016). Three universal nuclear-powered Design 22220 
icebreakers are under construction at the Baltic Shipyard 
in order to maintain the functions and expand the scope of 
tasks performed by the fleet of nuclear-powered icebrea-
kers: Arctica (was launched in June, 2016, operational 
commissioning is planned for 2019), Sibir (was launched 
in October, 2017, operational commissioning is planned 
for 2020) and Ural (keel laying ceremony took place in 
July, 2016, operational commissioning is planned for 
2021). Two RITM-200 reactor units (RU) will be included 
in the composition of NSGs of this design of icebreakers.
Search for investors is ongoing and design projects of 
construction of icebreakers in the long-term perspective 
until 2030 are explored:
– Two universal nuclear-powered Design 22220 ice-
breakers (to be added to the three vessels indicated 
above);
– Leader icebreaker with two RITM-400 NSGs for all-
year round navigation;
– Multi-functional nuclear icebreaker of off-shore type 
with RITM-200B NSG for solving tasks of sea shelf 
development.
The only nuclear-powered Sevmorput icebreaking car-
go LASH vessel with KLT-40 NSG is in operation besides 
the icebreakers.
Transportable and stationary 
lower-power nuclear power plants
According to NEA OECD and IAEA estimations, instal-
led capacity of LPNPPs in the world will reach 21 GW 
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by the year 2035. Commissioning from 2 to 10 GW(e) 
of new capacities will be required for supporting the de-
velopment of social and industrial infrastructure in the 
Arctic region of Russia until 2030 with total fraction of 
nuclear energy plants reaching 30% under the condition 
of complex development of this direction.
Floating Design 20870 power unit with two KLT-40S 
(floating nuclear cogeneration heat and electrical power 
plant - FNPP) is currently in the later stages of practical 
implementation. Beginning of test operation of this power 
unit is expected in near future. The Town of Pevek in the 
Chukotka Autonomous Region was chosen as the loca-
tion site for the first FNPP, beginning of operation was 
synchronized with shutting down the Bilibino NPP and is 
planned for 2019. Construction of a series of power plants 
of this type is necessary for ensuring continuous power 
supply in the target region taking into consideration the 
specific features of the FNPP design (factory repair after 
each of two 12 year-long operational cycles). Thus, con-
struction of one or two more FNPPs optimized cost-wise 
as compared with the pilot power plant for achieving com-
petitiveness can be expected before 2030 after thorough fi-
ne-tuning of the technology in real operational conditions.
For power supply of coastal consumers, as well as 
consumers removed from the sea it is advisable to use 
transportable modular LPNPPs with up to 10 MW(e) po-
wer per unit. LPNPPs of SHELF type represented by the 
series of different configurations of nuclear power plants 
on the basis of the unified 6.4-MW(e) land-based SHELF 
reactor unit represent the development effort with the hig-
hest degree of substantiation of the technical and finan-
cial model of their application. Other promising type of 
LPNPP is represented by the design project based on the 
cogeneration 12-MW(th) plus 6-MW(e) ABV-6E reactor 
unit either land-based or in the composition of a floating 
power plant. No decision on the starting these projects has 
yet been made, but, taking into consideration the dynami-
cs of their development and the real existing needs, the 
beginning of works on the construction of pilot units can 
be expected within the next six – eight years.
As reported by mass media (for instance, (Compact Nu-
clear Batteries 2018)), the Defense Ministry design pro-
jects on the development of LPNPPs are under realization. 
As of August, 2017 negotiations with investor are ongoing 
on the development of pilot samples of 1 MW(e) and 100 
kW(e) power units for providing electricity supply to iso-
lated remote consumers. The target objects for application 
of such power plants in the Arctic can be meteorological 
and hydrological stations and posts, scientific research ba-
ses, radiolocation stations, airfields used for both military 
and for civil purposes. Unattended LPNPP of megawatt 
power class will be mounted on tractive vehicles or semi-
trailers that can be transported by water routes. Descripti-
on of the project in open sources is not yet accessible, but 
the closest in terms of power capacity (Compact Nuclear 
Batteries 2018) are the LPNPPs with ATGOR gas-cooled 
reactor unit and LPNPP on the basis of light-water VITY-
AZ reactor unit developed by the NIKIET JSC.
Reactors with direct energy conversion of nuclear 
energy into electricity used for power supply of equip-
ment of space missions, GAMMA pilot demonstration 
nuclear thermoelectric unit with electrical capacity up to 
6.6 kW(e) and ELENA nuclear thermoelectric unit with 
68-kW(e) electrical capacity (engineering design), as well 
as Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTG) (~ 0.3 
kW(e)) earlier applied in navigation beacons, radio bea-
cons and on meteorological stations are the prototypes of 
unattended nuclear energy units with application of the 
technology of direct conversion of nuclear energy into 
electricity (up to 100 kW(e)). Expected lead time for the 
implementation of power units pilot projects constructi-
on with electric power of the order of 1 MW(e) and 100 
kW(e) is tentatively scheduled for the year 2023 under the 
condition of the beginning of investment in 2017-2018 
(Compact Nuclear Batteries 2018).
LPNPP application in the Arctic 
economical aspects
In contrast to nuclear power generation technologies in 
shipbuilding the scale of application of LPNPPs is de-
termined by their competitiveness (in terms of aggrega-
te costs and cost of generated energy) as compared with 
other types if power supplies. Implemented technical 
and financial analysis of options of LPNPP application 
in the Arctic demonstrated relative efficiency of some 
of the projects (Low-Power Nuclear Power Plants 2015, 
Kudinovich 2016, Sarkisov et al. 2018a, Nikitin et al. 
2015, Smolentsev 2012, Possibilities for Employment of 
Low-power NPPs 2016, Small Modular Reactors 2016, 
Approaches for assessing the economic competitiveness 
of small and medium sized reactors 2013).
Despite the high relative capital investments (RCI) (for 
instance specific RCI for nuclear power plants with capa-
cities of the order of 1 MW(e) and 5 MW(e) are estimated 
to be equal to 3 mln. rubles and 1 mln. rubles, respective-
ly) integral costs for LPNPPs grow slower as compared to 
conventional energy units operated on targeted sites (die-
sel electric power plants (DEPP), CCGT plants, coal heat 
and electricity plants) because of absence or significant 
reduction of supplied fuel costs , which is reflected, as the 
result, in the levelized costs of energy (Figs 1, 2).
The drivers of reduction of cost of the LPNPP main 
production, i.e. electricity, determining LPNPP competi-
tiveness, are the modular configuration of power units and 
their production in batches. Estimation of LCOE reducti-
on for LPNPP for the case of batch production is presen-
ted in Fig. 3.
Increase of scale of LPNPP application can be expec-
ted in mid-term perspective taking into account relative 
competitiveness of LPNPP for the target regions of ap-
plication in the Arctic. Table 1 contains compilation of 
the forecasted data on the use of nuclear power units for 
the purpose of development of Arctic region taking into 
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account the industrial potential and the necessity of deve-
lopment of service infrastructure, economical efficiency, 
as well as certain known parameters of reactor units which 
can be used during subsequent stages of work during im-
plementation of a scenario modeling and assessment of 
risks of development of emergency situations.
The presented materials clearly illustrate the state-
ment made at the beginning of the present paper on the 
wide variety of types and design of LPNPPs complica-
ting their operation and increasing expenditures during 
the whole lifetime. This leads us to the conclusion on 
the advisability of examination as the first priority the 
unified design projects of fully factory assembled mo-
dular LPNPPs.
Safety of LPNPPs application in 
the Arctic
Transfer of the most dangerous operations, both nuclear 
and radiation, associated with repairs, fuel reshuffling 
and decommissioning from the LPNPP site to the factory 
shops will allow ensuring high level of safety and quali-
ty of the performed procedures and minimizing environ-
mental consequences (Low-Power Nuclear Power Plants 
2015, Sarkisov 2011).
The main method for delivering modules of LPNPPs, 
as well as nuclear fuel (including INF) to the regions of 
their operation or to the objects of centralized infrastruc-
ture are towing or transportation along the Northern Sea 
Route. Transportation of certain power units (except unat-
tended) is planned to be performed together with reactor 
cores for subsequent fuel re-loading. For example, four 
sets of reactor cores for each of the reactor units, as well 
as INF storage unit for the return trip will be loaded on 
board the FNPP. Factory testing (mooring testing, fuel 
loading, reactor start-up, test operation, shutdown) will 
be performed before shipping LPNPPs to the place of 
their operation. For ensuring compliance with legal requi-
rements reactor units will be shipped in the cooled-down 
mode after isolation. Thus, at the moment of transportati-
on structural elements of cooled-down reactor units will 
contain, in addition to the reactor cores, radioactivity ac-
cumulated in the process of testing. Activity during the 
return trip to the production facility upon completion of 
the fuel irradiation cycle will be significantly higher. The-
refore, thorough safety analysis of the objects during all 
phases of their life-cycle is necessary.
The following navigation accidents with possible re-
lease of radionuclides in the environment in case of frac-
ture of pipeline or damage of storage facilities for spent 
nuclear fuel or solid radioactive wastes are examined as 
the main events for transportable power units and icebrea-
kers: ramming by other sea vessel, sinking in shallow or 
deep waters, taking the ground. These accidents refer to 
beyond design-basis accidents with probability not higher 
than 10-6 year-1 (Kudinovich 2016, Kuznetsov et al. 2014).
Nevertheless, for substantiating safety of transported 
objects it is also necessary to examine consequences of 
their extended presence at the sea floor in case of poten-
tial accidental sinking. This is also necessary because 
preparation of projects of submersible capsular LPNPPs 
is ongoing including the following: Project AISBERG, 
SHELF type submersible unit , submersible power mo-
dule with SVIR reactor unit on the basis of lead-cooled 
fast reactors.
Investigation under the research project “Development 
of methodological approaches and mathematical models 
for forecasting environmental impacts in case of accidents 
on nuclear floating objects, modeling spread of radiation 
on Arctic sea areas in case of accidents” conducted by 
the team from the Nuclear Safety Institute of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences are intended to make contribution 
Figure 1. Accumulated integral costs for years of operation of 
megawatt-class power plants in the Arctic: 1 – 1-MW diesel 
electric power plant; 2 – 1-MW nuclear power plant.
Figure 2. Estimated Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) for mega-
watt-class power plants in the Arctic (NPP – nuclear power plant).
Figure 3. Estimated LCOE for batch production (NPS – nuclear 
power source).
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in obtaining scientifically substantiated estimation of the 
level of threat and risks in making decisions on the future 
development of the direction in question.
Nuclear reactors, reactor compartments of nuclear 
submarines and screen assembly of the Lenin nuclear 
icebreaker (Sarkisov et al. 2015) sunken at the bottom 
of the Arctic Ocean in the Kara Sea in 1960-70-ies were 
examined as model cases in the course of studies and 
assessment of risk of environmental impact in case of 
sinking nuclear and radiation dangerous objects. Model 
and software means were developed for estimating time 
of expected destruction of protective barriers of such 
objects by corrosion (Sarkisov et al. 2018). Data on the 
multi-layer shielding (protective containment, physical 
boundaries of the cooling loop, fuel pin cladding, fuel 
composition), accumulated activities, outside dimensi-
ons and structural materials corresponding to the sun-
ken object were used as the input information. Here, 
the algorithm for calculation of corrosion destruction of 
protective barriers for simple objects (steam generators, 
reactor vessels and lids, etc.) amounted to the calcu-
lation of the time for the development of penetrating 
holes and complete dissolution of objects, while that 
for complex objects (sealed reactor vessels and reac-
tor compartments) amounted to the analysis of possible 
ways for penetration of sea water and stage-by-stage 
corrosion destruction of all encountered barriers (Sar-
kisov et al. 2015, Sarkisov et al. 2018, Sivintsev et al. 
2005, Reistad Ole and Ilgaard Povl 2006). Quantitative 
estimation of consequences from the object residing on 
the sea bottom is based on the modeling of each of the 
stages of degradation: corrosion process – penetration 
of radionuclides in the marine environment – spread of 
radioactivity and isotopic composition of the contami-
nants.
It was demonstrated that the rate of release of radionu-
clides beyond the limits of corroding materials, their pe-
netration and spread in the environment are described by 
the following equations:
 , i = y, z
with the following boundary conditions:
Here, t is the time of corrosion, years; Q(t) is the rate 
of release of radionuclides in the sea water, Bq/yr; S is the 
surface area of the corroding material, m2; m is the mass 
of the corroding material, g; v is the corrosion rate, mm/
yr; V0 is the initial volume of the corroding material, m3; λi 
is the decay constant of the i-th radionuclide, yr-1; l is the 
number of nuclides under examination; qi(0) is the speci-
fic activity of i-th radionuclide at the moment of sinking 
(t = 0), Bq/g; f(t) is the function taking into account the 
variation of activity on the corroding surface due to the 
non-uniform distribution of activity over the thickness of 
the structural element; for instance, reactor vessel or lid; C 
is the volume activity at the point with coordinates (x,y,z), 
Bq/m3; U is the flow rate along x-axis, m/s; ky, kz are the 
coefficients of turbulent diffusion, m2/s; σ is the dispersion 
in lateral directions, m; z-axis is directed from the bottom 
to the surface, with x, y and z axes forming a right-handed 
coordinate system.
Results of investigation demonstrated that in case of 
residence of the object at sea bottom release of radionuc-
lides in the marine environment due to corrosion destruc-
tion of protective barriers can take place not earlier that 
after 300 – 400 years. Methods for salvaging and bringing 
nuclear-hazardous objects from the sea bottom can be and 
will be found and implemented during this period.
Increase of concentration of technogenous radionucli-
des in bottom sediments in the vicinity of sunken objects 
as compared to the background will occur in case of re-
lease of radionuclides in the marine environment. Howe-
ver, concentration of radioactive substances at the distan-
ce of over 1000 m from the sources of release will not be 
Table 1. Parameters of reactor units operated (planned for oper-
ation) in the Arctic.
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PK-900A 4 2 1 171 Intermetallide ≥ 40 5–6 207
KLT-40M 2 0 1 171 Intermetallide ≥ 89 10 Up to 200
KLT-40 1 0 1 135 Intermetallide ≥ 89 10 151
RITM-200 4 10 2 175 Ceramic metal ≤ 20 7 (10–12) 438
RITM-200B 0 1 2 209
Unified with RITM-200 reactor unit
RITM-400 0 2 2 315
KLT-40S 2 4–6 1 150 UO2 ≤ 20 3 290
ABV-6M
0 1–2
2 38 UO2 ≤ 20 10–12 190
SHELF 2 38 Intermetallide ≤ 20 4–6 –
VITYAZ
0 1–4
2 6
– ≤ 20
6
–
ATGOR 2 3.5 10
*) Modular configuration; 2 – Integrated configuration.
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significantly different from the concentrations induced by 
global fallouts (Fig. 4) (Sarkisov et al. 2018).
Results of computer modeling of spread of activity 
over the water area for the case of maximum possible 
burst release or of protracted slow effluence in the en-
vironment beyond the limits of protective barriers for 
different scenarios up to the complete destruction of the 
reactor and fuel assemblies conducted using the com-
bined model of marine dynamics and particle transfer 
on the basis of IVM-IO ocean dynamics model (Ibrayev 
et al. 2012) demonstrated that for maximum hypothe-
tical accidents regions of radioactive contamination of 
sea water with 137Cs in excess of concentrations permis-
sible according to Russian regulations are localized in 
the vicinity of places of sinking of nuclear objects. The 
highest concentrations of 137Cs will be detected in sea 
water during the initial stages (up to 20 days after the 
accident) at the distances up to 10 – 20 km from the 
source. Concentration of 137Cs within this sea area can 
reach 0.1 – 10 of the permissible concentration. Con-
centration of the radionuclide will decrease in these 
regions within one – two months as the result of its dif-
fusion and will become comparable to the background 
after three months.
The developed models and software solutions make 
contribution in the development of understanding about 
the safety of sunken objects, because modeling can be 
regarded as the method for preventing emergency situ-
ations and for estimation of their consequences for the 
marine systems. The developed computer codes allow 
obtaining prompt assessment of the degree of hazard of 
the object and only after that making decisions on the 
necessity or impracticality of attraction of additional 
computer, financial or human resources for susbsequent 
detailed study of the risks. The above mentioned mathe-
matical models and software complexes can be extended 
on any offshore based objects creating threat of develop-
ment of emergency situations.
Conclusions
Taking into account the increased demand in LPNPPs for 
the purposes of development of remote regions, the above 
mentioned financial and technological advantages of these 
energy plants, as well as minimum possible environmental 
consequences in case of hypothetical accidents qualitative 
change of attitude towards the use of such energy plants 
can be expected. For optimistic scenario of development of 
nuclear power technologies (see Table 1) up to 26 reactor 
units will be in operation in the Arctic by 2030 including 
icebreakers NSG, floating and land based power plants. 
The number of transportable and operable reactor cores 
will amount to several dozens. Such scale of use of nuclear 
power is possible only under the condition of accelerated 
development of the associated infrastructure, including that 
pertaining to ensuring safety and protection of personnel, 
population and environment in cases of deviations from 
normal operational modes of radiation-hazardous objects 
and penetration of radioactive materials in Arctic sea areas. 
In support of importance of the topic under discussion let 
us notice that the “General provisions on ensuring safety of 
sea vessels and other floating craft equipped with nuclear 
reactors” (NP-022-17) approved during the period of pre-
paration of the present paper makes provisions, as pertains 
to the measures for ensuring safety (Level 5 Anti-accident 
planning), for the implementation of realistic (non-conser-
vative) analysis of beyond design-basis accidents contai-
ning estimations of probabilities for accident propagation 
paths and consequences for preparing emergency response 
plans (Ristekhnadzor Order of 09.04.2017).
Creation of the system of types and performance 
characteristics of nuclear power units used or planned 
to be used in the Arctic, technologies for handling these 
units, as well as quantitative estimation of environmental 
impacts in case of potential emergency situations lead to 
the conclusion on the necessity of LPNPPs development 
based on the implementation of modular principle in their 
design providing for the possibility to develop units with 
different power capacities due to the possibility to select 
configurations with power units of the same type.
The research was funded from the grant of the Russian 
Science Foundation (Project no. 17-19-01674).
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